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RECENT CASES
Admiralty-Venue of Proceedings under the Jones Act-Sea-
man filed libel for personal injuries under Jones Act I and obtained service
on respondent's vessel while within Port of Philadelphia, in which district
respondent corporation was neither domiciled nor had its principal office.
Held (by the court in banc), the service was inadequate. Brown v. C. D.
Mallory & Co. et al., 34 F. Supp. 541 (E. D. Pa. J94o).2
The Jones Act extended to seamen all the federal statutes applying to
injuries sustained by railroad employees in interstate commerce.3 Thus
under the Act, the seaman may proceed on the common law side of the
court, or in admiralty.4  It is well settled that in actions at law under the
Act, the respondent must either reside or have his principal office in the
district in which the action is begun,5 and the court in the instant case has
decided that admiralty proceedings under the Act are likewise governed by
its venue provisions.' This is the strictly logical interpretation that if the
remedies of the Act are to be invoked, the seaman is bound by all the pro-
visions thereof.7 Other decisions have held, however, that admiralty pro-
ceedings are not included by the words "in such actions", on the theory
that the Jones Act was not designed to affect the former jurisdiction of the
federal courts," but merely changed the law to be applied when the cause
is triedY The declared purpose of the Jones Act, however, was to promote
the welfare of American seamen; 10 and further, if the libelant in the instant
case had not claimed the benefits of the Jones Act, the court would have had
jurisdiction.1 ' Thus it seems unfortunate that under this most recent
decision the seaman's rights are curtailed in several ways. Joinder of
defendants residing in different districts probably will not be permitted, and
several suits will usually be necessary; 12 if the shipowner resides at a dis-
1. 41 STAT. 1007, 46 U. S. C. A. § 688. (This section provides "Jurisdiction in
such actions shall be under the court of the district in which the defendant employer
resides or in which his principal office is located.)
2. Panko v. Commercial Molasses Corp. et al., 34 F. Supp. 548 (E. D. Pa. i94o);
Moriority v. Commercial Molasses Corp. et al., 34 F. Supp. 548 (E. D. Pa. 1940) ;
Hagelin v. Commercial Molasses Corp. et al., 34 F. Supp. 548 (E. D. Pa. 1940);
Gibbs v. Commercial Molasses Corp. et al., 34 F. Supp. 548 (E. D. Pa. 194o) (All
four were decided on the basis of opinion in the instant case).
3. Panama R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U. S. 375, 392 (1924); see Pillsbury, Jurisdic-
tion Over Injuries to Maritime Workers (1932) 18 VA. L. REv. 740, 755.
4. Plamals v. The Pinar Del Rio, 277 U. S. ir (1928).
5. Davenport v. Sinclair Navigation Co., 3o F. Supp. 191 (E. D. Pa. I939);
Caceres v. U. S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp., 299 Fed. 968 (E. D. N. Y.
1924) ; Barrington v. Pacific S. S. Co., 282 Fed. goo (D. Ore. 1922) ; Olafson v. Water-
man S. S. Corp., 281 Fed. 194 (S. D. Ala. 1922).
6. See note i supra, for the venue provisions.
7. The Pomona, 1938 Am. Mar. Cas. 1357 (S. D. Cal. 1938) ; Bannon v. Seaboard
Air Line Ry. Co. et al., 52 F. (2d) 886 (S. D. Ga. 1930) ; Stein v. Standard Oil of
Cal., 36 F. (2d) 258 (S. D. N. Y. 1929).
8. Essigman v. Standard Oil Co., no report for publication; Carr v. The Union
Sulphur Co., 1937 Am. Mar. Cas. 227 (E. D. Pa. 1936); Eckert v. Socony Vacuum
Oil Co., Inc., 13 F. Supp. 342 (E. D. Pa. 1935).
9. McKola v. McCormick S. S. Co. et al., 24 F. Supp. 378 (N. D. Cal. 1938);
McDaniel v. Baker Sand & Gravel Co., 24 F. (2d) 987 (S. D. Ala. 1928).
10. 41 STAT. 988, 46 U. S. C. A. § 861; Panama R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U. S. 375
at 379.
ii. See McDaniel v. Baker Sand & Gravel Co., 24 F. (2d) 987 (S. D. Ala. 1928).
12. See McKola v. McCormick S. S. Co. et aL., 24 F. Supp. 378, 379 (N. D. Cal.
1938). (235)
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tance, seaman will be subjected to additional trouble and expense; 13 and
finally, if defendant is a foreign corporation with its principal office abroad,
it is difficult to see how the Jones Act could be invoked at all, 14 although
the Act has been construed as designed to provide the sailor with a con-
venient forum. 15 While the instant decision has the virtue of applying the
law to the letter, it is not easy, from a practical viewpoint, to justify the
result, especially since the court, in reaching it, was forced to overrule three
of its own decisions. 6
Banks and Banking-Power of National Bank to Pledge Assets
to Secure Federal Deposits-A national bank pledged assets to secure
federal deposits made by three separate governmental agencies.' Upon
insolvency, the receiver brought suit to recover the pledged assets or their
proceeds. Held (three justices dissenting), that the receiver could not
recover since national banks may pledge assets to secure deposits made by
federal agencies, even in the absence of express statutory authorization.
2
Inland Waterways Corp. v. Young, 309 U. S. 517 (1940) .3
13. Cf. Leffellard v. Detroit & Cleveland Nay. Co., 16 F. (2d) ion (W. D. N. Y.
1926); Stewart v. Pacific Steam Navigation Co., 3 F. (2d) 329 (S. D. N. Y. 924).
14. See Arthur v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 72 F. (2d) 662 (C. C. A.
5th, 1934) (Service upon sub-agent of respondent was held proper in Canal Zone, when
respondent was French corporation with principal office in Paris).
15. Arthur v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 72 F. (2d) 662 at 664 (C. C.
A. 5th, 1934).
16. See note 7 supra. That the result will be a virtual denial of substantive rights
to seamen, see McKola v. McCormick S. S. Co. et al., 24 F. Supp. 378 (N. D. Cal.
1938); Eckert v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., Inc., 13 F. Supp. 342 (E. D. Pa. I935).
For a general discussion of related problems, see Note (925) 1 WASH. L. REV. 141.
i. Inland Waterways Corporation (wholly owned by U. S.), United States Ship-
ping Board Merchant Fleet Corporation (wholly owned by U. S.), and, the Secretary
of War on behalf of the Panama Canal Zone.
2. By Ray. STAT. § 5153 (1875), 12 U. S. C. A. §9o (1934), the Secretary of
Treasury is authorized to designate a national bank as a depositary of public money
and to require such bank to give satisfactory security for its safekeeping and prompt
payment. This was all that the original National Banking Act provided concerning
the pledging of assets to secure deposits. By subsequent legislation, with the exception
of the 193o Amendment [46 STAT. 8og (1930), 12 U. S. C. A. §go (9.34) : "Any asso-
ciation (national bank) may, upon the deposit with it of public money of a State or any
political subdivision thereof, give security for the safe-keeping and piompt payment of
the money so deposited, of the same kind as is authorized by the law of the State in
which such association is located in the case of other banking institutions in the State."
See Marion v. Sneeden, note 5 infra, for construction of this Amendment], national
banks have been given the power by specific statutory grant to secure certain specific
United States deposits as, e. g., 30 STAT. 562 (1898), ii U. S. C. A. § ioi (I934), re-
quiring national banks to pledge bonds to secure deposits of bankrupt estates. See also
Texas & Pacific Ry. v. Pottorff, 291 U. S. 245, 257, n. I (934), and Note (i939) 26
VA. L. REv. 197, 198.
This section authorizing the Secretary of the Treasury to deposit public money in
national banks and to require security, was construed by the instant Court to be
. an exaction of duty from the Secretary as to monies subject to his control
and not as a limitation upon the power of the bank to give security when it may
.be required by'other Government officers and agencies charged with the custody of fed-
eral funds." Instant case at 522. However, the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia, construed this section as having a ". . . limited application to deposits
made by the Secretary of the Treasury and cannot be extended to cover all public
funds of every sort which may be deposited in a national bank by someone who holds
the funds on behalf of the United States." Inland Waterways Corp. v. Hardee, 1oo F.
(2d) 678, 683 (App. D. C. 1938).
3. Reversing Inland Waterways Corp. v. Hardee, 'oo F. (2d) 278 (App. D. C.
1938).
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In two prior decisions, Texas & Pacific Ry. v. Pottorff and Marion v.
Sneeden,4 the Supreme Court promulgated the rule that national banks have
no power to secure any deposits except federal deposits specifically permitted
to be secured by Acts of Congress and funds of state and local govern-
mental agencies where located in a state in which state banks are so author-
ized.5 The theory adopted was that, "The measure of their powers is the
statutory grant; and powers not conferred by Congress are denied." 6 Despite
the fact that the funds deposited by the federal agencies in the instant case
did not come within the scope of specific legislative sanction,7 the instant
Court took the position that national banks have the power, by implication,
to pledge assets to secure any federal deposit.8 The reason given for the
creation of the power was the long continued practice of public officers in
requiring pledges for federal funds, with the knowledge and acquiescence
of the Comptroller of Currency.9 However, prior to the Amendment .of
193o, 10 national banks frequently pledged assets to secure deposits of state
or local governmental agencies with the knowledge and acquiescence of the
comptrollers of currency who assumed that the national banks had such
power,'- but the Supreme Court held in the Sneeden case 2 that despite
such knowledge and acquiescence, this assumption was erroneous, and no
such power was to be implied.' 3 The instant Court, however, in addition
to relying upon "power implied from practice", 14 has added the argument
that such a power can also be implied from the "incidental powers" clause 15
of the National Banking Act.' When the argument of "power implied
from incidental powers clause" was advanced in the Pottorff and Sneeden
cases, it received scant consideration at the Court's hands.' 7  Thus the
decision would seem to be an instance of judicial legislation when considered
in the light of the Pottorif and Steeden cases, the reasoning of which the
instant Court professed fully to accept.' Upon the other hand, there is
merit in the position taken by the majority of the instant Court, which was
substantially that the so-called specific grants of power to demand collateral
were really specific imposition of duties and no limitation at all upon the
4. See note 5 infra.
5. Marion v. Sneeden, 291 U. S. 262 (1934) (a national bank has no power to
pledge its assets to secure a deposit of public money of a state or a political subdivision
thereof unless it is located in a state in which state banks are so authorized) ; Texas
& Pacific Ry. v. Pottorff, 291 U. S. 245 (1934) (a national bank has no power to
pledge its assets to secure a private deposit). See also Lewis v. Fidelity Co., 292 U. S.
559, 564.(I934) for a statement of the holding of the two cases. See note 2 mspra.
6. Texas & Pacific Ry. v. Pottorff, 291 U. S. 245, 253 (1934).
7. Instant case at 523.
8. Id. at 523, 524.
9. Id. at 524.
Io. See note 5 mpra.
ii. See Marion v. Sneeden, 291 U. S. 262, 269 (1934). See also Note (I931) 79
U. oF PA. L. REV. 6o8.
12. Marion v. Sneeden, 291 U. S. 262 (1934).
13. See note II mpra.
14. Instant case at 524.
15. Ray. STAT. 5136 (1875), 12 U. S. C. A. § 24 (1934). A national banking asso-ciation shall have power to . . . prescribe, by its board of directors or duly author-
ized officers or agents, subject to law, all such incidental powers as shall be necessary
to carry on the business of banking . . . by receiving deposits . .
16. See Colorado Bank v. Bedford, 310 U. S. 41, 49 (1940) (this case not decided
upon the point involved in the instant case).
17. See Marion v. Sneeden, 291 U. S. 262, 269 (934); Texas & Pacific Ry. v.
Pottorff, 291 U. S. 245, 254 (1934). See also Note (1940) 26 VA. L. REV. 197, 198;
Note (1931) 79 U. OF PA. L. REV. 6o8, 615; (1934) 1o IND. L. J. 177, 178.
18. Instant case at 519.
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power of federal banks to pledge assets for federal funds.19 In the light of
this view, the language of the Pottorf and Sneeden cases, which was broad
enough to cover such a case as this, can only be considered as unfortunate.
Conflict of Laws-Substituted Service on Foreign Executors of
Nonresident Motorists-Deceased resident of Ohio, while driving in
Nebraska, was alleged to have negligently injured the plaintiff, a guest
in his automobile. In an action brought in Nebraska against the foreign
executors of the decedent, service of process was had on the Nebraska
Secretary of State. Held, the court had no jurisdiction over the defend-
ants because the Nonresident Motorist Statute' was inapplicable to for-
eign executors. Downing v. Schwenck, 293 N. W. 278 (Neb. i94o).
The common law rule that nonresident absentees are not subject to
the exercise of personal jurisdiction by the courts of another state 2 has
been altered by Nonresident Motorist Statutes,3 which have been held
constitutional when they provide for a method reasonably certain to give
the nonresident notice of the suit.4  Such statutes have been held unani-
mously 5 not to apply to foreign executors of deceased nonresidents. 6
This strict interpretation 7 is based upon two theories; first that death of
the nonresident terminates the agency of the state officer to receive process
against him," and second that foreign judgments against executors can-
ig. Id. at 522.
I. This statute provides that nonresident owners and operators of automobiles on
Nebraska highways are deemed to have appointed the Nebraska Secretary of State as
agent to receive service of process in all actions arising out of the operation of the
motor vehicle on Nebraska highways. Plaintiffs in such actions are also required to
send a copy of the process to the defendant by registered mail. NEB. CoMP. STAT.
(1929) § 20-530.
2. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714 (1878) ; GooDmcH, CONFLICT op LAws (2d ed.
1938) 165; SHIPMAN, COMMON LAW PLEADING (3d ed. 1923) 22, n. 14; AMRAM,
PENNSYLVANIA COMMON PLEAS PRACTICE (4th ed. 1936) 34, n. 9.
3. For a collection of Statutes affecting nonresident motorists see Note (1935) 20
IOWA L. REV. 654, 66o. For comments on the Pennsylvania Statute see AuRAm, op.
cit. supra note 2, at 38, n. 28. For an extension of similar process against nonresident
owners and operators of aircraft, see id. at 39.
4. Early statutes requiring nonresident owners to appoint the Secretary of State as
agent to receive process were held constitutional. Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U. S. i6o
(i916). Subsequent legislation providing for such service without the actual appoint-
ment of the state official was also held valid. Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U. S. 352 (927),
76 U. oF PA. L. REv. 93, 4 Wis. L. REV. 307; Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U. S. 6zo
(1914) ; RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) § 85, Illustration 2. Nor will it be
held a violation of the due process clause where such statutes are applied to a non-
resident owner who bailed his automobile outside the state. Young v. Masci, 289 U. S.
253 (1933). But where the statute does not provide for a method of notice reasonably
certain to notify the nonresident of the suit, there is a violation of due process, although
the question of notice is not an element of the existence of the jurisdiction, but goes
only to the reasonableness of the exercise of that jurisdiction. Wuchter v. Pizzutti,
276 U. S. I3 (928).
5. GOODRICH, op. cit. supra note 2, at 168.
6. Riggs v. Schneider's Ex'r., 279 Ky. 361, i3o S. W. (2d) 816 (i939); Lepre v.
Real Estate Land Title Trust Co., ii N. J. Misc. 889, i68 Atl. 858 (1933); Donnelly
v. Carpenter, 55 Ohio App. 463, 9 N. E. (2d) 888 (I936); State v. Davidson, 216 Wis.
216, 256 N. W. 718 (1934).
7. Courts refuse to apply such statutes to persons other than those expressly named
therein. "Liberal construction cannot, for the purpose of embracing other persons than
those to whom a statute is expressly made applicable, supply that which the legislature
has either deliberately, or inadvertently, or through lack of foresight omitted." Instant
case at 279, 280.
8. Dowling v. Winters, 208 N. C. 521, 181 S. E. 751 (1935) ; Young v. Potter
Title & Trust Co., 114 N. J. L. 561, 178 Atl. 177 (i935) ; Arlotta v. McCauley, 16 Pa.
D. & C. 657 (i93). See RESTATEMENT, AGENCY (1933) § 120.
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not be proved against the decedent's estate.9 But it would seem that
since the state official acts in behalf of interests adverse to the nonresident,
his power is more than that of a mere agent, and hence need not, by vir-
tue of any rule of agency, be affected by the nonresident's death.10 More-
over, by analogy 11 to cases of dissolved foreign corporations which have
ceased to do business in the state, there should be a disability to revoke or
terminate the agency relationship during the period of the statute of limita-
tions.1 2 But such a rationalization may become unnecessary since some legal
writers have already abandoned the fictions of consent and agency, and
argue that jurisdiction is based solely upon the state's police power.' 2 On
the other hand, an executor, since he is a court officer and cannot be
interfered with by the courts of another state, is subject to suit only in
the state of his appointment.1 4 His representative capacity cannot pass
beyond the limits of the state of his appointment which reserves exclusive
authority over all the assets of the estate within its limits.' 5 To hold other-
wise would allow the state of the forum to administer assets properly
within the control of another state.16 Although the policy of protecting
the public' 7 from injuries resulting from the operation of automobiles
by nonresidents and of creating a convenient method of suit', is best
9. In re Cowham's Estate, 220 Mich. 56o, i9o N. W. 68o (1922) ; 3 BEAL., Cox-
ILICr OF LAws (1935) § 514.1. See Durie v. Blauvelt, 49 N. J. L. I14, 6 Atl. 312
(1886) for a holding that a foreign executor cannot be sued in his representative capac-
ity in the absence of an enabling statute. See McMaster v. Gould, 24o N. Y. 379, 148
N. E. 556 (I925) for a holding that a New York statute purporting to permit the ren-
dition of a personal judgment against foreign representatives is unconstitutional. See
also Helme v. Buckelew, 229 N. Y. 363, 128 N. E. 216 (1920).
iO. RESTATEmENT, AGENCY (1933) §§ 138-39. This suggestion is also urged in
(1935) 49 H~Av. L. REv. 145.
Ii. Cardozo argues that one of the four methods by which the judicial process
operates is by analogy. "The directive force of a principle may be exerted along the
line of a logical progression; this I call the rule of analogy. . . ." CARDozo, THE
NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (921) 30, 31. See Patterson, Cardozo's Philosophy
of Law (1939) 88 U. OF PA. L. REV. 71, i6I.
12. It has been held that a dissolved corporation of a foreign state which was
named as defendant in an action, was effectively served by the service of process on the
proper state official within the period of the statute of limitations. Washington v.
Superior Court, 289 U. S. 361 (I933).
13. Scott, Jurisdiction Over Nonresident Motorists (1926) 39 HARv. L. REv. 563.
"It is not accurate to speak of this jurisdiction as based on consent. It may be doubt-
ful if the out of state visitor even knows of the statutory provision, much less consents
to it. It must be said that when one does acts (at least some kinds of acts) in a state,
it lies within the power of the state to make him amenable to its courts in litigation aris-
ing from those acts." GOODRICH, op. cit. supra note 2, at 166.
14. GOODRICH, op. cit. mepra note 2, at 488.
15. Jefferson v. Beall, 117 Ala. 436, 23 So. 44 (18_8).
6. GOODRICH, op. cit. supra note 2, at 491. See Greer v. Ferguson, 56 Ark. 324,
19 S. W. 966 (1892) for a holding that even though the personal representative appears
in a suit brought in a state other than the state of his appointment, no jurisdiction is
conferred in matters affecting the state.
17. Most of the statutes do not limit the availability of the statute to residents of
the state. The right of the nonresident plaintiff has been upheld under these statutes
even though he is a resident of the same state as the defendant. In New Jersey, where
the statute requires the plaintiff to be a resident, the courts are very liberal in adjudg-
ing a person to be a resident. CHEATHAm, DOWLING, GOODRICH, CASES AND OTHER
MATERIALS ON CoNFLicr or LAWS (1936) z01.
I8. "Motor vehicles are dangerous machines, and even when skillfully and care-
fully operated, their use is attended by serious dangers to persons and property. In the
public interest, the state may make and enforce regulations reasonably calculated to
promote care on the part of all, residents and nonresidents alike, who use its highways.
The measure in question operates to require a nonresident to answer for his conduct in
the state where arise causes of action alleged against him, as Well as to provide for a
claimant, a convenient method by which he may sue to enforce his rights." Mr. Justice
Butler, in Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U. S. 352, 356 (1927).
240 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
served by applying these statutes to personal representatives of non-
resident motorists, 9 nevertheless, well settled principles 20 of interstate
administration of decedents' estates bar a more liberal interpretation of
the statutes.
Evidence-Federal Rule of Admissibility When Illegally Ob-
tained-Federal inspectors arrested the defendant under warrant and
found incriminating papers during search of premises. Held, since the
search for evidence was illegal, the evidence was inadmissible. United
States v. Thompson, 113 F. (2d) 643 (C. C. A. 7th, 194o).
State police found evidence while searching defendant's car without
warrant. Held, evidence illegally obtained by one other than a federal
agent is admissible. Gregg v. United States, 113 F. (2d) 687 (C. C. A.
8th, 194o).
Federal courts do not follow the common law rule that admissibility
of evidence is unaffected by illegality of procurement.' The federal rule,
illustrated by the Thompson case, is that the Fourth Amendment, restrain-
ing unreasonable searches, is historically and logically connected with the
Fifth, which guarantees the privilege against self-incrimination; so that
evidence procured in violation of the former is inadmissible under the
latter. 2 The Gregg case follows decisions restricting the rule to evidence
obtained by federal agents 8 on the accepted principle that the Bill of
Rights was imposed by the states on the federal government and does not
bind the states.4 Therefore the Fourth Amendment prevents the legaliza-
tion of a trespass by federal warrant and does not affect anyone not acting
under federal authority. However, the general federal rule cannot stand
on its historical premise since the Fourth and Fifth Amendments come
19. (1935) 49 HARv. L. REv. 145, 146.
2o. See notes 9, 14, I5, 16 supra. "A judgment against a foreign administrator in
his representative capacity under a statute allowing a foreign administrator to be sued
does not create an obligation which can be proved in any other state as a claim against
the estate of the decedent." REsTATEmENT, CoxNLicr OF LA:ws (934) § 514.
i. This is law in England and most states. See cases cited in 8 WiMoaRE EvI-
DENCE (3d ed. 294o) § 2183, n. i and n. 2.
2. In Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616 (I886), the Supreme Court properly
held a statute forcing defendant to produce incriminating papers a violation of the Fifth
Amendment. The Court then said, at 633, "We have been unable to perceive that the
seizure of a man's private books . . . to be used in evidence . . *. is substantially
different from compelling him to be a witness against himself." Cf. Lord Camden in
Entick v. Carrington, i9 How. St. Tr. 1029, 1073 (1765) : ". . . the law obligeth no
man to condemn himself . . . and it should seem that search for evidence is disal-
lowed upon the same principle." The theory that a common principle underlies both
Fourth and Fifth Amendments is developed in Atkinson, Admissibility of Evidence
Obtained Through Unreasonable Searches and Seizures (1925) 25 COL L. REV. ii.
For general discussion of the federal rule and the history of the Amendments see i
COOLEY, CoNsT. Limrrs (8th ed. 1927) 61o-635; Fraenkel, Concerning Searches and
Seizures (1921) 34 HARv. L. REv. 361; Harno, Evidence Obtained by Illegal Search
and Seizure (1925) i ILL. L. R~v. 303; Wood, The Scope of the Constitutional Im-
munity Against Searches and Seizures (1927) 34 W. VA. L. Q. 1, (1928) id. at 137.
The effect of Prohibition on the doctrine is outlined in Waite, Reasonable Search and
,Research (1938) 86 U. OF PA. L. Ray. 623.
3. Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383, 398 (1914) ; Burdeau v. McDowell, 256
U. S. 465 (I92i) ; and numerous cases cited in 8 WIarOpE, EviDENcE § 2184a, n. 3.
4. "These amendments demanded security against the apprehended encroachments
of the general government-not against those of the local governments," Marshall,
C. J., in Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243 (U. S. 1833), at 247. Jack v. Kansas, ig
U. S. 372 (19o5) ; Ohio v. Dollison, 194 U. S. 445 (19o4) ; Bolln v. Nebraska, 176
U. S. 83 (igoo) ; Eilenbecker v. Plymouth Co., 134 U. S. 31 (1889) ; Spies v. Illinois,
123 U. S. 131 (1887) ; I COOLEY, op. cit. supra note 2, 66. But cf. State v. Hiteshew,
42 Wyo. 147, 292 Pac. 2 (1930).
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from different sources,5 and it is logically fallacious in making the admis-
sibility of evidence turn, not on its intrinsic worth, but on the collateral
issue of the detective's guilt or innocence. 6 It is supported only by the
court's reluctance to be party to unfair enforcement of the law. 7  Since it
is no longer practical to protect the Constitutional immunity by actions
of trespass," and district attorneys do not prosecute their agents for ex-
cessive zeal, 9 the courts remain the sole defenders of the Fourth Amend-
ment, and the federal rule their only weapon.10 It has been urged that
an unreasonable search by state police is just as unfair and just as hard
to prevent, that it is wrong to restrict a rule of policy by strict statu-
tory construction, and that the present rule is "either too strict or too
lax"." Certainly the present state of the law tempts federal agents se-
cretly to arrange searches by private detectives. 12  On the other hand the
real purpose of the rule is not to discourage all illegal searches but only
to uphold the Fourth Amendment. 3 Courts are understandably reluctant
to expand an illogical rule of pure policy beyond the limits required to
effectuate that policy.
Labor Law-Provisions in Trade Agreement in Restraint of
Trade-Alleging that as independent business men 1 they would be
5. The Fourth Amendment reflects the dislike of general search warrants, which
were held illegal in England, Entick v. Carrington, ig How. St. Tr. 1o29 (1765) ; but
were upheld in the colonies, Paxton's case, Quincy 51 (Mass. 1761). The Fifth sprang
from hatred of the ecclesiastical "ex officio" oath, Lilburn's Trial, 3 How. St. Tr. I315
(1637). See 8 WIGMoa., EVmENCE § 2250. In Rex v. Wilkes, 2 Wils. K. B. I5I, 95
Eng. Rep. 737 (1763), although the privilege against self-incrimination was well
known, Wilkes did not object to evidence obtained under a general search warrant on
that ground. For general history see citations note I supra.
6. 8 WIGMRE, EVIDENcE § 2184.
7. See Justice Brandeis, dissenting in Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U. S. 465, 477
(1921), "Respect for law will not be advanced by resort, in its enforcement, to means
which shock the common man's sense of decency and fair play." Cf. Sorrells v. United
States, 287 U. S. 435 (932) (entrapment).
8. Atkinson, note 2 supra, 22, n. 5. The author points out that often the nominal
damages awarded will not even cover the cost of bringing suit, and that the sympathies
of the jury may well lie with the policeman against a plaintiff who is a radical alien,
etc. Cf. Waite, note 2 supra, discussing the difficulty of determining any policy with-
out adequate factual material.
9. Atkinson, note 2 supra, 23, n. 57, shows that there were no prosecutions for
illegal searches under either the Espionage Act, 40 STAT. 230 (1917), i8 U. S. C. A.
§631 (1927), or the National Prohibition Law, 42 STAT. 223 (1921), iS U. S. C. A.
§ 53 (927) (during its first three years) although both provided for such prosecutions.
o. "The Fourth Amendment would be a dead letter if the United States Supreme
Court had not since the decision in Weeks v. United States adopted the exclusion
theory," Chafee, The Progress of the Law X919-1922 (1922) 35 HAv. L. REV. 673,
695. See also Atkinsoi, note 2 supra, at 26. For a vigorous denunciation of the rule
see Knox, Self Incrimination (1925)74 U. OF PA. L. R'v. 139.
ii. Justice Cardozo in People v. Defore, 242 N. Y. 413, 15o N. E. 585 (1926).
12. Chafee, note io supra, at 703. Of course if the collaboration is proved in
court, the evidence is inadmissible, Gambino v. United States, 275 U. S. 310 (1927) ;
Byans v. United States, 273 U. S. 28 (1926) ; Crank v. United States, 61 F. (2d) 98I
(C. C. A. 8th, 1932).
13. Note 10 supra. But cf. Nardone v. United States, 308 U. S. 338 (1939) and
Weiss v. United States, 308 U. S. 321 (I939) (wire-tapping cases, both reported in
(194o) 9 BRooKaYx L. REV. 214). Apparently wire-tapping is illegal, 48 STAT. io64,
1103 (1934), 47 U. S. C. A. § 605 (939), but not unconstitutional, Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U. S. 438 (i928) ; yet the evidence obtained is inadmissible.
i. Known in the trade as "bob-tails". The laundry drivers are employed by the
companies on a commission basis; but the "bob-tails", after soliciting the business and
doing only a very minor portion of the laundering process themselves, have the main
work done by the laundry companies on a contractual basis, making their profits from
the prices they in turn charge their customers for the complete laundry service.
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forced out of business, plaintiffs sought to enjoin the enforcement of cer-
tain price, sale, and apportionment of business provisions 2 of a trade
agreement entered into by the defendant union of laundry drivers and
substantially all the steam laundry companies in the Philadelphia area,
which attempted to govern the relations of these companies with the plain-
tiffs. On demurrer, held (one judge dissenting),3 injunction granted,'
since the provisions effect an unlawful restraint of trade. Schwartz v.
Laundry and Linen Supply Drivers' Union, et al., i4 A. (2d) 438 (Pa.
Sup. Ct. 1940).
In granting this injunction, the majority opinion effectively revived
the flexible concept of restraint of trade as applied to peaceful union activ-
ity,5 and invalidated a trade agreement voluntarily entered into by the em-
ployer and the union-an arrangement seldom disturbed at the instance
of third persons adversely affected.6 This result is made conspicuous by
the contrary authority of other jurisdictions in similar situations,7 espe-
cially since in the instant case it was only by this type of;contract that the
union could practically cope with the serious problem at hand. But pro-
visions for resale price maintenance 8 and apportionment of business 9
have already been held to be against a defined public policy 10 relating
specifically to the free flow of articles of commerce, so that, even though
serious encroachments as evidenced by Fair Trade legislation have been
made on this whole concept," it seems, at least to this court, that their
presence in almost any agreement, labor contract or not, is reason enough
for holding it invalid. The approach of the dissenting opinion is more
2. ". . . the parties agree that the laundry company will not accept work from
any "bob-tail" who is not a member of the union nor from "bob-tails" with whom it is
not now under contract or for whom it is not now performing laundry service, the
"bob-tails" shall not charge lower prices in selling their laundry services than those
charged by the company to its own retail customers, that no person not now engaged
as a "bob-tail" shall be accepted as such by the company or be eligible for membership
in the union, and that a "bob-tail" in selling his "route" must first offer it for sale to
the company with which he does business and then, if the offer is not accepted, to any"bob-tail" who is a member of the union or to another laundry company upon the same
terms and conditions ..
3. Four opinions were filed. The concurring opinion answered the dissent, and a
supplemental dissenting opinion was then filed in reply.
4. The provision that the plaintiffs become members of the union was upheld.
5. Boudin, The Sherman Act and Labor Disputes (1939) 39 COL. L. REv. 1283,
1293, (940) 40 CoL L. REy. 769; Shulman, Labor and the Anti-Trust Laws (1940)
34 ILL. L. REv. 769, 787. For a comprehensive analysis of anti-injunction legislation
intended to have an important effect in this respect see Etter, Statutory Definitions of
Labor Dispute (1940) ig ORE L. R-v. 2oi.
6. Kemp v. Division No. 241, 255 Ill. 213, 99 N. E. 389 (1912) ; Pickett v. Walsh,
192 Mass. 572, 78 N. E. 753 (igo6).
7. American Fur Mfrs. Ass'n, Inc. v. Associated Fur Coat and Trimming Mfrs.,
i6I Misc. 246, 291 N. Y. Supp. 6io (Sup. Ct. 1936) (contract between union and trade
association providing for one collective agreement in fur marketing industry not in re-
straint of trade under anti-trust statute) ; Maisel v. Sigman, 123 Misc. 714, 205 N. Y.
Supp. 807 (Sup. Ct. 1924) (contract between union and association of manufacturers
limiting work to be sent to "subcontractors" not in restraint of trade) ; cf. New York
Clothing Mfrs. Exch., Inc. v. Textile Finishers' Ass'n, Inc., 238 App. Div. 444, 265
N. Y. Supp. 105 (1st Dep't 1933) (upheld agreement of members of association con-
trolling 80% of industry not only to abide by minimum prices, but also not to accept
work from customers with whom they had not previously dealt). But cf. Buckelew v.
Martens, io8 N. J. L. 339, i56 Atl. 436 (193) (agreement entered into by laundry
companies to make "bob-tails" charge customers a minimum price is invalid).
8. Buckelew v. Martens, io8 N. J. L. 339, 156 At. 436 (1931).
9. Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U. S. 427 (1932).
10. Phila. Cleaners & Dyers Ass'n, Inc. v. Dollar Cleaners & Dyers Ass'n, i9 Pa.
D. & C. (1933).
ii. On the general subject of price control and the effect of Fair Trade legisla-
tion see GanrHaa, PRaIc CONTROL (1939).
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realistic, for it treats the whole arrangement as nothing more than a prac-
tical closed shop,12 which has been legalized by legislation in Pennsyl-
vania, 3 and which gives the plaintiffs no standing in court.14  Funda-
mentally, the instant case goes far in demonstrating that the problem,
though legal, demands social and economic considerations; and that oppo-
site results are reached by divergent interpretation of the facts, not ot
the law applicable thereto.15 The legal issue may be presented as one of
restraint of trade, as here, or of defining "labor dispute" for purposes of
anti-injunction legislation,' 6 or even of issuing a writ of habeas corpus; 17
nevertheless the primary determinant is the extent to which the courts
will allow a labor union to reach out collaterally for control over, not em-
ployees in the strict sense, but persons in competition with the union.
Practically, the decision is of greater importance than the confines of
this case would seem to indicate, since it casts serious doubt upon the
validity of numerous existing labor contracts containing provisions similar
to those invalidated here,' and precludes the ends sought by these con-
tracts from being proper objects of peaceful union activity.
Restraint of Trade-Right of the United States to Sue for Treble
Damages-The United States brought suit under Section seven of the
Sherman Act 1 to recover damages alleged to have been sustained because
of a combination by defendant tire companies to fix prices in bidding on
government contracts. Section seven allows treble damages to "any per-
son" injured by such a conspiracy. Held, (one judge dissenting) The
United States cannot be considered a "person" with the right to sue under
Section seven. United States v. Cooper Corporation, 114 F. (2d) 413
(C. C. A. 2d, J940).2
The law is well settled that only the United States can enforce the
equitable and criminal provisions of the Act,8 while an individual is lim-
12. The authorities are fairly evenly divided on the legality of the closed shop.
RESTATEMENT, TORTS, EXPLANATORY NOTEs (Proposed Final Draft No. 6, 1939) §§ 33,
56, s8.
13. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1939) tit. 43, §§ 2o6a, 21..
14. ". . . if (striking for closed shop be lawful), what is there unlawful in nego-
tiating with an employer to accomplish through peaceful negotiations that which the
law permits to be done through strikes . . .? If the railroad in this instance acting
through its own initiative, determined to dispense with the services of non-union men,
I know nothing in the law which would prevent them from doing so. . . . it might
be an unpleasant situation for all, but, nevertheless one with which the law could not
interfere. Recognizing this, I take it that it would not be unlawful because such a de-
termination had been arrived at by the solicitation or request of the unions or labor
organizations. And then, to go one step further, why should it become illegal if the
arrangements and determinations were embodied in a contract or written agreement
with the labor organization. . . ." Crane, Ch. J., in Williams v. Quill, 277 N. Y. x,
12 N. E, (2d) 547 (i937).
..... MIf the facts in this case and any reasonable inferences therefrom were
as stated in the dissenting opinion, undoubtedly all the members of the court would
have agreed with the view there taken. . . ." Instant case at 442; see Bomes v.
Providence Local No. 223, 5, R. I. 500, 503, 155 Atl. 581, 582 (1931).
I6. Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union, 301 U. S. 468 (1937) (labor dispute
existed when union picketed employer who did his own work).
17. Cf. People ex rel. Sandnes v. Sheriff of Kings County et al., 164 Misc. 355,
299 N. Y. Supp. 9 (Sup. Ct. 1937) (question of labor dispute would be examined in
habeas corpus proceedings).
I8. A number of such contracts are referred to in the instant case at 446.
1. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U. S. C. A. § 15 (1934).
2. The Circuit Court affirmed the decision of the district court to be found in 31 F.
Supp. 848 (D. C. S. D. N. Y. i94o).
3. Sections one, two, four and six of the Act: note i supra.
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ited to a suit for treble damages under section seven.4 The court here
held that Congress intended these remedies to be exclusive and that the
United States was limited to the criminal and equitable remedies.
5 More
consistent with the basic statutory purpose 6 might have been the con-
clusion that the criminal and, equitable remedies in the Act were given to
the United States in its governmental capacity as the protector of the
public interest, and that section seven provided not only a remedy where
the United States is injured in its financial or proprietary interests, but
also an additional deterrent for illegal combinations in restraint of trade.7
As the application of various, conflicting rules of statutory construction 
8
have produced a square division of authority 9 on the question whether
or not the United States is a juristic "person" or can take advantage of
a statutory remedy unless expressly named, the instant court could have
found ample precedent for such a conclusion.'0 Moreover, it can well be
4. Union Pacific R. R. v. Frank, 226 Fed. 9o6 (C. C. A. 8th, 1915); Pidcock v.
Harrington, 64 Fed. 821 (C. S. D. N. Y. 1894).
5. None of the cases cited by the court in support of this conclusion hold directly
that the remedies are exclusive. General Investment Co. v. Lake Shore Ry., 26o U. S.
261 (1922) ; Fleitman v. Welsbach Co., 240 U. S. 27 (1915) ; Wilder Mfg. Co. v. Corn
Products Refining Co., 236 U. S. 165, 174 (1914); United States v. Patterson, 20r
Fed. 697 (D. C. S. D. Ohio 1912), reversed on other grounds, 222 Fed. 599 (C. C. A.
6th, 1915), cert. den. 238 U. S. 635 (1915) ; Greer Mills & Co. v. Steller, 77 Fed. I, 3
(C. C. W. D. Mo. 1896); Pidcock v. Harrington, 64 Fed. 821, 822 (C. C. S. D. N. Y.
1894).
6. The basic purpose is to prevent the detriment to consumers resulting from non-
competitive prices established by combinations in restraint of trade; a number of de-
cisions have held that the right to personal recovery under section seven was incidental.
Abouof v. Spreckels Co., 26 F. Supp. 830, 832 (D. C. N. D. Cal. 1939); Glenn Coal
Co. v. Dickinson Fuel Co., 72 F. (2d) 885, 889 (C. C. A. 4th, 1934).
7. See Wilder Mfg. Co. v. Corn Products Co., 236 U. S. 165, 174 (1914).
8. See (1938) 86 U. OF PA. L. Ray. 436 for a collection of authorities on the gen-
eral rules of statutory construction.
9. See Cotton v. United States, 52 U. S. 229 (ii How. 229, 231, 1850) ; Dugan v.
United States, 16 U. S. 172 (1818) (As to the United States being a juristic person) ;
Nardone v. United States, 302 U. S. 379 (1937) ; Helvering v. Stockholms Enskilda
Bank, 293 U. S. 84, 91, 92 (1934) ; Stanley v. Schwalby, 147 U. S. 508, 517 (1893)
(U. S. held in these cases to be within the statutory remedies available only to "per-
sons") ; Sherwood v. United States, 112 F. (2d) 587 (1940) (Burden imposed on the
sovereign by including it within the scope of the word "person"); In re Tidewater
Coal Exchange, 28o Fed. 648, 65I (C. C. A. 2d, 1922); In re Western Implement
Company, 166 Fed. 576 (D. C. D. Minn. i9o9); Ohio ex rel. Fulton v. Saal, 239 App.
Div. 420, 267 N. Y. Supp. 558 (1933) ; id., 240 App. Div. 902, 267 N. Y. Supp. 56o,
561, appeal dismissed on other grounds, 264 N. Y. 465, 191 N. E. 516 (1934) (Burden
imposed on the sovereign). Cf. Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U. S. 370, 371 (1934) ; Giddings
v. Holter, ig Mont. 253 (1897) ; Republic of Honduras v. Soto, 112 N. Y. 310 (1889) ;
Martin v. State, 24 Tex. 61, 68 (1859). Contra: Title Guaranty & Surety Co. v.
Guarantee Title & Trust Co., 174 Fed. 385 (C. C. A. 3d, 19o9) ; Matter of Will of Fox,
52 N. Y. 530 (1873). See also Commonwealth v. Welosky, 276 Mass. 398, 403, 404
(931) ; cf. United States v. Fox, 94 U. S. 315 (i876) ; Davis v. Pringle, i F. (2d)
86o (C. C. A. 4 th, 1924) ; United States v. Securities Corporation General, 4 F. (2d)
619 (App. D. C. 1925).
lO. Section seven does not expressly give nor specifically deny the right of the
United States to sue. Section eight defining the meaning of the word "person" fails
either to include or to exclude the United States from its definition of the word. In
drafting the Clayton Act, when Congress intended to exclude the United States from
the scope of such broad words as "any person", it did so expressly, § 16 (8 STAT. 737,
I5 U. S. C. A. §26 (1934)). Furthermore, nothing in the congressional debates or
successive drafts indicates clearly that Congress did or did not intend the remedy to be
available to the United States. 21 CONG. REc. 1767-1769, 2563-64, 2569, 2641, 2615,
3150 (1889-9o). And as section seven is not penal in nature, it should not be strictly
construed in favor of the violators of the Act. See Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works
v. Atlanta, 203 U. S. 390 (19o6) ; Greer v. Kennan, 64 Fed. 6o5, 607 (C. C. A. 8th,
1933) ; Camunas v. N. Y. & R. R. SS. Co., 26o Fed. 4o, 52 (C. C. A. Ist, 1919) ; see also
Donovan and Irvine, Proof of Damages Under the Anti-Trust Law, Note (940) 88
U. OF PA. L. REv. 511, at page 524. Contra: Greer Mills Co. v. Stoller, 77 Fed. I, 3
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argued that the remedy afforded by section seven is the only method of
fully compensating the government for the loss sustained when the gov-
ernment is forced to buy at non-competitive prices,11 for the urgent need
for supplies and materials cannot wait for a final disposition of a criminal
or equitable proceedings. 1 2  And considering the fact that government
purchases in recent years have been and are increasingly large in volume,
the additional threat of treble damages would be a more effective deterrent
than the criminal or equitable proceedings.' s
Taxation-Propriety of Municipal Expenditures to Attract New
Industry-The state refuses to validate bond issue, approved by elec-
torate, to pay agent's contingent fee for services in inducing pulp and
paper mills to locate in the city. Held (one justice dissenting), the bonds
are valid. This is a proper expenditure of municipal funds under charter
authorizing city to do all things necessary for the general welfare of its
inhabitants. City of Fernandina v. State, 197 So. 454 (Fla., 194o).
Municipal powers are derived solely from the state by charter or leg-
islative enactments, with the constitutional limitation that taxation must
be for a municipal purpose.' The propriety of the city's activities is sub-
ject to no definite test, although it has been said that there must be a
"public" as opposed to a "private" purpose.2  Such projects as improving
streets,3 constructing electric light plants,4 providing for water supply,5
establishing schools " or public libraries 7 are considered as sufficiently
(C. C. W. D. Mo. I896). The instant court relied strongly on the analogy to the inter-
pretation of § 64 (b) (5) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 30 STAT. 54 (1898) (11
U. S. C. A. § 104 (b) (5) (1934)), in Davis v. Pringle, I F. (2d) 86o (C. C. A. 4th,
1924) ; aft'd 268 U. S. 315 (1925). The analogy is weak in that it involves the con-
struction of a statute, the language, provisions, and purpose of which are clearly dis-
similar to those in the Sherman Act. Immediately after this decision Congress amended
§ 64 (b) (5) so as to undo the effect of this decision. The Act of May 27, 1926, c.
406, § I5, 44 STAT. 666. In re C. D. Hauger Co., 54 F. (2d) 117 (D. C. N. D. Tex.
1931) ; cf. Lincoln v. Ricketts, 297 U. S. 373 (1936) (Hughes, C. J.) ; see also In re
Western Implement Co., I66 Fed. 576 (D. C. D. Minn. io9) ; aff'd 171 Fed. 81 (C. C.
A. 8th, 1gog).
ii. See DEP-. OF JUsTIcE RELEASE OF FE. 20, 1939, 3 C. C. H. Trade Reg. Serv.
(8th ed.) § 17,013.
12. T. N. E. C. Release No. 22, Dec. 28, 1939.
13. T. N. E. C. Release No. 22, Dec. 28, 1939. The majority in the instant case
at 414, refused to impose such a liability "by indirection". Compare the views on the
decision in the district court on the instant case to be found in (1940) 35 ILL. L. REV.
223; and in (1940) 26 VA. L. REv. 958.
I. Fla. Const Art. IX, § 5; McAllister, Public Purpose in Taxation (1930) 18
CAmF. L. REv. 137, 138 n. 2, 241. Under the Federal Constitution it was held that tax-
ation for other than a public puspose is taking property without due process of law
within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, Fallbrook Irrigation District v.
Bradley, 364 U. S. 112, 158 (1896).
2. COOLEY, TAXATION (4th ed. 1924) § 174.
3. It re Lockitt, iio N. Y. S. 32, 36, 58 Misc. 5 (3928) ; Imboden v. Bristol, 132
Tenn. 562, 179 S. W. 147 (1915).
4. Opinion of Justices, 15o Mass. 592, 24 N. E. 3O84 (389o) ; State v. Allen, 178
Mo. 555, 77 S. W. 868, 876 (1903).
5. Webrle v. Board Water & Power Cornrs Los Angeles, 211 Cal. 70, 293 Pac. 67
(1930) ; Frederick v. Augusta, 5 Ga. 561 (1848).
6. Frost v. Central City, 134 Ky. 434, 120 S. W. 367, 368 (I9O9) ; Board of Edu-
cation v. Van Zandt, 195 N. Y. S. 297, 319 Misc. 124 (1922); but cf. Livingston
County Supervisors v. Weider, 64 Ill. 427 (3872) ; but in Root v. Erdelmeyer, 37 Ind.
225 (1871) under statute prohibiting the taxation of national bank stock for municipal
purposes, it was held taxes for schools not a municipal purpose.
7. Tampa v. Prince, 63 Fla. 387, 58 So. 542 (1912) ; State v. Bentley, 163 Wis.
632, 158 N. W. 306 (I916).
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vested with the public interest to constitute a proper municipal purpose.
But loans to individuals,8 and gifts 9 or investments 10 in private corpora-
tions are always held a private purpose and improper. Between these
extremes are a number of municipal undertakings upon which courts di-
vide as to their propriety. Those limiting municipal activities suggest
that "municipal purpose" should be construed in its originally strict sense
including little more than the police powers; that as additional services
are rendered, a special class and not the public will be receiving the bene-
fits."' Liberal courts would leave the range of municipal activities flexible,
determining what is proper when the constitution is construed rather than
what was considered proper when the constitution was adopted. In such
light the instant case was held a proper municipal purpose. While the
dissent fears that this decision will authorize taxation for any purpose that
might contribute to the city's economic prosperity, 2 it seems to stand
only as authority for the attraction of new industry by an agent on a
purely contingent fee basis. Since municipal advertising has previously
been held a proper purpose,'3 it could be said that this agent was in effect
advertising the municipality's natural business advantages. Moreover,
since the support of the unemployed is well recognized as a proper munici-
pal expenditure, 4 the decision of the instant case would seem well founded
in considering the prevention of unemployment by the attraction of new
industry an equally proper municipal expenditure.
Taxation-Sales Tax on Vendor as Burdening Interstate Com-
merce-tUnder a state tax' on the transfer of shares of stock, New
York stockbrokers were assessed on a sale to foreign buyers. Held (three
justices dissenting), the sales tax did not burden interstate commerce within
the meaning of the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution. 2 O'Kane
v. State, 283 N. Y. 439, 28 N. E. (2d) 905 (1940).
Although dogma declares that interstate commerce cannot be taxed at
all, s modem judicial tendency is rapidly enlarging the scope of the state
8. Allen v. Inhabitants of Jay, 6o Me. 124 (1872). And even where the recipients
of advances were property owners whose buildings had been destroyed by a public dis-
aster, such advances for rebuilding were held unconstitutional, Lowell v. Boston, iii
Mass. 454 (1873).
9. Cole v. LaGrange, 113 U. S. I (1884) ; Markley v. Village of- Mineral City, 58
Ohio St. 430, 51 N. E. 28 (1898).
io. Parkersburg v. Brown, io6 U. S. 487 (1882); Citizen's Savings and Loan
Assoc. v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655, 66o (U. S. 1874) ; Weismer v. Village of Douglas, 64
N. Y. 91 (1876).
ii. But in Spahn v. Stewart, 268 Ky. 97, 1035 S. W. (2zd) 65, (1937) a slum
clearance and low cost housing project was held to constitute a public purpose even
though only a special class would be housed. The court looked beyond a direct benefit
to a special class and saw the safeguarding of the entire public from the menace of the
slums.
x2. City of Fernandina v. State, 197 So. 454, 457 (Fla. 194o).
13. Jacksonville v. Oldham, 112 Fla. 502, I5O So. 619 (1933) ; see Loeb v. Jack-
sonville, ioi Fla. 429, 441, 134 So. 205, 209 (1931).
14. San Francisco v. Collins, 216 Calif. 187, 13 P. (2d) 912 (1932 ) ; Jennings v.
St. Louis, 332 Mo. 173, 58 S. W. (2d) 979 (1933).
i. N. Y. TAX LAW c. 59, §§ 270, 27oa.
2. U. S. CoNsT. ART. 1, § 8.
3. Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District, 120 U. S. 489 (1887). See also
Fisher's Blend Station, Inc. v. State Tax Commission, 297 U. S. 65o (1936); State
Tax Commission of Mississippi v. Interstate Natural Gas Company, Inc., 284 U. S. 41
(1g3i) ; Real Silk Mills v. Portland, 268 U. S. 325 (925).
RECENT CASES
taxing jurisdiction despite resultant influences on interstate business activ-
ity.4 This trend is evidenced by the validating of "use" taxes 5 which were
imposed on resident buyers purchasing outside the state in an effort to reach
those transactions deemed beyond the sphere of local sales taxes. The
majority opinion in the instant case purports to follow McGoldrick v.
Berwind-White Coal Mining Co.8 which by analogy to the "use" taxes
upheld a municipal sales levy on the buyer in a contract for goods to be
imported, and thus took a novel step in expanding state jurisdiction at the
expense of an interstate commerce. The dissent points out that the factual
situations essentially differ in that the present circumstance involves an
assessment on the seller, and property is to leave rather than enter the
taxing locality. Hence, the majority's holding, in conjunction with the
Bernind-White decision, brings to reality the often prophesied danger of
discrimination against interstate trade 7 since seller's state as well as buyer's
is permitted to tax the same agreement. It would therefore seem important
that courts come squarely to grips with the economic and political effects of
multiple taxation. Essentially, the problem constitutes a conflict between
the need for increased local revenue 8 and the maintenance of immunity of
interstate commerce from state regulation. The ultimate decision should
evolve a practical rather than a philosophical concept of exactly what con-
stitutes an undue burden.9 If, as one branch of authority fears,10 double
assessment is an undue burden on interstate transactions, then the line could
well be drawn at Berwind-White's taxing of the purchaser, for the seller's
state has more numerous sources of income. 1' But if the power to limit
multiple taxation belongs exclusively to Congress, as three members of the
present Supreme Court suggested in a recent dissent,12 then the instant case
in representing this advanced viewpoint affords commercial states a lucra-
tive source of income through the medium.of a sales tax on vendors.
4. Southern Pacific Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U. S. 167 (1939) ; Wiloil Corporation v.
Pennsylvania, 294 U. S. i69 (I935) ; Powell, New Light on Gross Tax Receipts (194o)
53 HAv. L. Rxv. gag.
5. Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 3oo U. S. 577 (1937); Monamotor Oil Co. v.
Johnson, 2 U. S. 86 (1934).
6. 309 U. S. 33 (194o).
7. See Gwin, White & Prince v. Henneford, 305 U. S. 434 (1939) ; Adams Mfg.
Co. v. Storen, 304 U. S. 307 (1938).
8. See Perkins, The Sales Tax and Transactions in Interstate Commerce (1933)
12 N. C. L. Rv. 99.
9. See Galveston, Harrisburg and San Antonio Ry. v. Texas, 210 U. S. 217, 227
(1908).
IO. See cases cited sipra note 7. Mr. Justice Stone in Western Live Stock v.
Bureau of Revenue, 3o3 U. S. 250 (1938) gave the first expression of the doctrine that
discrimination against interstate commerce consists in the bearing of a multiple tax
burden. This rationale seems impossible to reconcile with Puget Sound Stevedoring
Co. v. State Tax Commission, 302 U. S. 9o (1937), where the nature of the transaction
precluded the possibility of an assessment by more than one state.
i. Sonneborn Brothers v. Cureton, 262 U. S. 5o6 (1923) (property tax on goods
to be shipped in interstate commerce) ; United States Glue Co. v. Oak Creek, 247 U. S.
321 (1918) (tax on income derived from foreign commercial undertakings); Utah
Power and Light Co. v. Pfost, 286 U. S. 165 (1932) (tax on manufacturing) ; Hope
Natural Gas Co. v. Hall, 274 U. S. 284 (1927) (tax on mining); Lacoste v. Depart-
ment of Conservation of Louisiana, 263 U. S. 545 (1924) (tax on severance). The
buyer's state seems limited to "use" and sales taxes.
12. See Justices Black, Frankfurter, and Douglas, dissenting in McCarrol v. Dixie
Greyhound Lines, Inc., 309 U. S. 176, 189 (1940), "Congress alone can, in the exer-
cise of its plenary constitutional control over interstate commerce, not only consider
whether such a tax as now under scrutiny is consistent with the best interests of our
national economy, but can also on the basis of a full exploration of the many aspects
of a complicated problem devise a national policy fair alike to the States and our
Union."
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Taxation-Taxability of Insurance Policy Proceeds as Dividends
-Corporation took insurance on the life of its president and named itself
beneficiary but later made a trust company the beneficiary to receive pro-
ceeds from the policy upon president's death and to distribute them to share-
holders." Shareholder sought insurance exemption for amounts received
from trust company.2  Held (one judge dissenting), the shareholder's
income was taxable as dividends.3  Golden v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 113 F. (2d) 590 (C. C. A. 3d, 194o).
It is well settled that a corporation, since it has an insurable interest in
its president,4 may insure itself against the death of that officer.5  The pro-
ceeds which the corporation later receives from the policy upon the presi-
dent's death are exempt from taxation.6 However, subsequent transference
of the income from insurance proceeds from the corporation to its share-
holders renders the distribution taxable as dividends.7 This case goes fur-
ther in holding s that even though the proceeds are never actually received
by the corporation, the situation is the same as though the corporation had
i. Under the "Agreement for the Distribution of Insurance" between the corpora-
tion, its stockholders, and the trust company among other provisions the corporation
reserved its right to hypothecate the policies for loans and to receive all dividends ac-
cruing on the policies. The corporation renounced its right to sell or assign any of the
policies except for purposes of hypothecation [italics supplied] and also the right to
change the beneficiary except with the consent of the trustee and stockholder bene-
ficiaries. Upon death of the insured, proceeds were to be paid to the trustee and then
distributed proportionately to the stockholders as of date of distribution. Delia B.
Golden, Executrix, 39 B. T. A. 676, 678 (1939).
2. Revenue Act of 1934, § 22: "(b) Exclusion from gross income. The following
items shall not be included in gross income and shall be exempt from taxation under
this chapter: (i) Life insurance. Amounts received under a life insurance contract
paid by reason of the death of the insured. . .
3. Revenue Act of 1934, § 15: "(a) Definition of dividend. The term 'dividend'
when used in this title . . means any distribution made by a corporation to its
shareholders, whether in money or in other property, out of its earnings or profits
accumulated after February 28, 1913. . . . (b) Source of distributions. For the
purposes of this chapter every distribution is made out of earnings or profits to the
extent thereof, and from the most recently accumulated earning or profits."
4. An "insurable interest" may be defined as "such an interest, arising from the
relations of the party obtaining the insurance . . . as will justify a reasonable ex-
pectation of advantage or benefit from the continuance of his life." i CoucH, INsTra-
ANCE (1929) § 292. See also (1931) 75 A. L. R. 1362.
5. U. S. v. Supplee-Biddle Hardware Co., 265 U. S. 189 (1924). See also Ven-
ters, Right of Corporation to Insure Life of Officerr (i93I) 35 LAW NOTES 46.
6. U. S. v. Supplee-Biddle Hardware Co., 265 U. S. x89 (1924).
7. Cummings v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 73 F. (2d) 477 (C. C. A. Ist,
1934); Isaac May, 2o B. T. A. 282 (793o).
In the May case an agreement was made with the stockholders that after the pro-
ceeds were paid to the corporation on an insurance policy which the corporation had
previously taken out on the life of its president the stockholders would receive the pro-
ceeds. The Board said that since the insurance company had never agreed to the dis-
tribution agreement or permitted a change of beneficiary, the stockholders received
dividends and not income from insurance.
In the Cummings case under practically the same factual circumstances the court
said that when the policies were taken out, it was intended that the proceeds should
swell the assets- of the company and then be paid to the stockholders. However, the
court said that "By taking out the policies in the name of the company as trustee for
such stockholders . . . there would be no question but the amounts received by the
petitioners were received under the life insurance contracts." Cummings v. Commis-
sioner of Internal Revenue, 73 F. (2d) 477, 479 (C. C. A. Ist, 7934).
It seems that the petitioner in the instant case tried to rely upon this statement of
the court in the Cummings case and claimed that such was the factual set-up in the in-
stant case, but the Board discarded the argument. Delia B. Golden, Executrix, 39 B. T.
A. 676, 682 (i939).
8. Instant case at 591.
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received the funds and subsequently distributed them as dividends. 9 This
seems to be a new application of the doctrine of constructive receipt 10
whereby a person (in this case the corporation), even though he assigns his
right to a certain income, is still considered for tax purposes to have received
it especially if he continues to exercise sufficient control over it,1 or if the
relation of the parties is such that there results, after the assignment, some
distinct gain to the assignor.1 2 It would seem that the corporation, in re-
nouncing its right to change the beneficiary, 13 relinquished its power to
control the flow of income. 14 However, the insurance company, by paying
the proceeds directly to the shareholders through the trust company, accom-
plished precisely what the corporation would have done upon receipt of the
monies and to that extent there is a gain to the corporation. 5 Once it is
established that the insurance proceeds are income to the corporation, the
question as to whether the subsequent distribution to the shareholders con-
stitutes taxable income ' 6 on the theory that the stockholders are merely
being compensated for a loss they incurred 17 does not arise. The broad
statutory definition of a "dividend" Is as any distribution by the corporation
to its stockholders so long as there is a surplus equal to the amount of the
distribution, clearly precludes that possibility 
9 in the present case.20
9. The question, therefore, which is presented to the court, as in so many tax
cases, is: "Shall we break this apparently integrated transaction into several constituent
parts or steps?" PAUL, SELECTED STUDIES ix FEDERAL TAXATION (2d series, 1938) 203.
io. ". . . an item is held taxable . . . on the theory that the transaction, re-
garded as a whole, means that the taxpayer has constructively received what he has not
actually received in a separate step." PAUL, op. cit. supraz note 9, at 215. See also
MONTGOMERY, INCOME TAX PROCEDURE (1925) 503, for discussion of regulations affect-
ing constructive income. Note that usually the Doctrine of Constructive Receipt is
applied to determine what person is taxable on certain income. In the instant case,
the doctrine seems to be used not for the purpose of rendering the corporation liable,
which was the "person" that "assigned" the income, as is the usual case, but rather
with the aim of showing that there is income coming to the corporation, which income
therefore is taxable upon later distribution.
II. MAGILI TAXABLE INCOME (1936) 248-267. See also Rosenwald v. Commis-
sioner of Internal Revenue, 33 F. (2d) 423 (C. C. A. 7th, 1924).
12. Magill, The Taxation of Unrealized Income (1925) 39 HARv. L. REv. 82, 9i-
IO0.
13. See note I supra.
14. Of course the corporation did exert considerable influence over the flow of income
to the enxtent that it paid the premiums and reserved the right to hypothecate the policy
for future loans. This only goes to show, however, that the test of control over flow
of income is not adequate in insurance cases, since under this test practically every in-
surance.policy proceeds would then be considered to have been delivered first to the
one paying premiums and then as a gift to the beneficiary. Such doesn't seem to be
the usual construction.
is. Magill, note 12 supra, at 96; Rensselaer & S. R. Co. v. Irwin, 239 Fed. 739
(1917) ; cf. General Utilities & Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U. S. 200 (1935),
where it was held that when a corporation distributed in specie, as dividends, shares
held in another company, which shares had increased in value, such gain in value of
the stock was not taxable as income to the distributing corporation despite the fact that
the whole affair was carried out by a written agreement of all the parties for the ex-
pressed intention of evading the income tax.
I6. "Income may be defined as the gain derived from capital, from labor, or from
both combined, provided it be understood to include profit gained through a sale or con-
version of capital assets." Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S. 189, 207 (1920).
17. MAGILL, op. cit. supra note ii, at 333-339.
I8. See note 3 supra.
19. The surplus in the instant case was more than the amount of the insurance
proceeds. See instant case at 592.
2o. The dissent's rationalization that in effect the shareholders themselves pur-
chased the insurance and hence are merely beneficiaries under their own insurance pol-
icy present complications under the law of insurance. There is no authority for the
proposition that a stockholder has such an insurable interest in the life of the president
of his corporation as to enable the stockholder to take out insurance on the president's
life. Insurance companies seem to proceed on the assumption there is no insurable
interest and hence generally do not issue such policies.
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Torts-Agent's Liability to Third Party for Inducing Breach of
Contract by Principal-Plaintiff, an insured bus company, alleged
that defendant, agent of the insurance company, had induced his principal
to breach its contract with plaintiff by "wrongfully, maliciously, and falsely"
representing certain facts which, if true, would have constituted grounds for
refusing payment of the policy. On motion to dismiss for failure to state
a cause of action, held, motion granted; an agent is not liable to a third
party for inducing breach of contract by his principal. Greyhound Corp. v.
Commercial Casualty Ins. Co., 259 App. Div. 317, 19 N. Y. S. (2d) 239
(1st Dep't I94O).
Although the existence of privilege as a defense to an action for
inducing breach of contract' has long been recognized, 2 rigid rules for
determining justification in specific fact situations have not as yet crystal-
lized.3 The instant case establishes the relationship of agency as absolutely
exempting the agent from liability to a third party in an action on this tort.
This result (supported by language in English cases 4 and in New York
lower court decisions 5) has been variously based on the agent's being the
alter ego of the principal; 6 upon the "absurd result" 7 of the principal being
liable to the promisee in tort for breaking his own contract if the doctrine
of respondeat superior be applied; 8 and upon a desire to protect the dis-
charge of fiduciary obligations. 9 However, other authorities, although
they agree as to the social desirability of granting a privilege to protect
the interest of the principal, make that privilege conditional upon the agent's
having in fact acted to protect his principal's welfare, thus imposing liability
where such purpose was absent.10 To free the agent from this liability for
i. For a review of authorities in this country which follow and extend the doctrine
of Lumley v. Gye, 2 E. & B. 216, 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (Q. B. 1853) see Carpenter, Inter-
ference sith Contract Relations (1928) 41 HARv. L. R-v. 728, Appendix A at 764, and
for cases contra, Appendix B at 768.
2. Brimelow v. Casson, [I924] 1 Ch. 302, and authorities there cited.
3. RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1939) § 767, comment a; Note (1926) 39 HARv. L. REv.
749, 751, in which the absence of such categories was held desirable.
4. G. Scammell & Nephew, Ltd. v. Hurley, [1929] i K. B. 419, 443 (alternative
holding) ; Said v. Butt, [ig2o] 3 K. B. 497, 5o6. The discussion of the court was
dictum as they held no contract between plaintiff and defendant's principal. Further-
more, in summarizing, the court specifically limited its statement to a "servant acting
bona fide". The English approach to privilege has differed somewhat from that in
America, and the weight of English authority here may be questioned. See Camden
Nominees Ltd. v. Forcey, [i94O] I Ch. 352, and the comment in 18 CAN. B. REv. 393,
396.
5. Hicks v. Haight, i7i Misc. i5i, 11 N. Y. S. (2d) 912 (Sup. Ct. 1939) ; Lukach
v. Blair, io8 Misc. 2o, 178 N. Y. Supp. 8 (Sup. Ct. gig), aff'd sub nor. Lukach v.
Reigart, 192 App. Div. 957, 182 N. Y. Supp. 935 (ist Dep't 192o).
6. Instant case at 242, quoting from Said v. Butt, [192o] 3 K. B. 497, 505. But cf.
Sidney Blumenthal & Co. v. U. S., 30 F. (2d) 247 (C. C. A. 2d, 12g). See also dis-
cussion of the instant case in (194o) 54 HARv. L. REv. 131, where there is an attempt
to limit the alter ego doctrine to directors of a corporation. This limitation may well
be questioned on reason and on authority, especially since the Said case in this con-
nection speaks specifically of master and servant and is so quoted in Lukach v. Blair,
Hicks v. Haight and the instant case. However, the extent to which the alter ego
argument may become insignificant is indicated by a situation in which the agent or
director is admittedly acting against the best interests of the corporation or principal,
actuated solely-by personal motives. In such cases, it is submitted, that doctrine should
not avail the agent. See note io infra.
7. (1921) 34 HARV. L. REV. 441, 442.
8. Said v. Butt, f 1920] 3 K. B. 497, 5o6.
9. Hicks v. Haight, 171 Misc. 151, i55, i1 N. Y. S. (2d) 912, 916 (Sup. Ct. 2939),
quoting from Lukach v. Blair, io8 Misc. 20, 22, 178 N. Y. Supp. 8, io (Sup. Ct. igig).
io. Sidney Blumenthal & Co. v. U. S., 30 F. (2d) 247 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929);
Caverno v. Fellows, 15 N. E. (2d) 483 (Mass. Sup. Ct. 1938) (by implication); Mc-
Gurk v. Cronenwett, igg Mass. 457, 85 N. E. 576 (igo8) ; Jones v. Stanly, 76 N. C.
355 (1875); see Morgan v. Andrews, 107 Mich. 33, 40, 64 N. W. 869, 871 (895);
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his own tortious conduct merely because a court may subsequently prefer
not to impose vicarious liability on the principal 11 would seem to be both
undesirable 12 and illogical. Furthermore, a recognition of the fact that the
tort action for inducing breach of contract was intended as a remedy for
intentionally inflicted damage not recoverable in a suit on the contract, 8
would indicate that there is no less reason for holding a principal vicariously
liable for this tort than for other intentional wrongs of the agent which are
not committed for the benefit of the principal. 14 Privileges which constitute
valid defenses in analogous situations involving interference with contract
rights, 15 and justifications of other intentional torts 16 are recognized for
reasons of social policy to further certain specific interests, and are con-
ditional upon their being used to assert the interests protected.' 7  In the
absence of any reason to extend the privilege of the agent in the instant case
beyond the limits for which it was created,' s it would seem preferable that
it, too, be granted as conditional rather than absolute.
Torts-Privilege of the Press to Describe Present Life of Former
Public Figure-Defendant publisher printed a cartoon and biograph-
ical sketch of the 39 year old plaintiff.' The latter's extremely publicized
RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1939) §770, and comment d thereto; HARPm, TORTS (1933)
§ 232 at 484; Carpenter, note I sup ra, at 746, 749, and criticizing Said v. Butt, [i92o]
3 K. B. 497, 505, at 752; Notes (x932) 17 CoRN. L. Q. 509, 519), (926) 39 HAgV. L.
REV. 749, 752. For a discussion of an analogous French principle see LA.ATr, 7 MAS-
TER & SERVANT (I913) § 2657 at 8,78.
This approach has been rejected on the ground that motive cannot create liability
where none otherwise existed. Hicks v. Haight, 171 Misc. 151, 155, II N. Y. S. (2d)
912, gi6 (Sup. Ct. x939) ; see Lord Watson in Allen v. Flood, [I898] A. C. 1, 92, and
Carpenter, note i supra, at 735. The weakness of this objection is made evident by an
examination of the law of malicious prosecution, defamation, and slander of title. See
Sayre, Inducing Breach of Contract (I923~) 36 HARV. L. REV. 663, 679, and authorities
there cited. Cf. Foster v. Retail Clerks' International Protective Ass'n, 39 Misc. 48, 53,
78 N. Y. Supp. 86o, 864 (Sup. Ct. 19o2). Professor Bohien wrote, "There is nothing
better setttled than that an act which normally has certain legal effects may have very
different effects if done for some particular purpose." BOHLE, Incomplete Privilege
to Inflict Intentional Invasions of Interests of Proerty and Personality, in STUDIES IN
TORTs (I926) 614, reprinted from (I26) 39 Hav. L. REv. 307. See Ames, How Faran Act May Be a Tort Because of the W:rongful Motive of the Actor (igo5) 18 Hav.
L. REV. 411.
ii. See note 8 supra.
12. See Note (1934) 48 HAav. L. REV. 298, 302.
13. See Lumley v. Gye, 2 E. & B. 216, 230, 118 Eng. Rep. 749, 754 (Q. B. 1853),
discussing the ruining of a man's business by inducing breach of a contract, whose
measure of damage may be small.
a 4. The leading case of Lloyd v. Grace, Smith & Co., [19121 A. C. 716, presents
a situation in which the principal was held liable for the fraud of his agent committed
in the course of his agency, but not for the benefit of the principal. The problem has
especial significance where the agent cannot respond in damages and recovery from
him cannot be had by the principal. But see (1921) 34 H~av. L. REv. 441, 442, cited
note 7 supra. Cf. Luke v. DuPree, T58 Ga. 59o, 597, 124 S. E. 13, 17 (1924).
15. Legis v. Marcotte, 129 Ill. App. 67, 72 (i9O6) (parental relationship) ; Lukas
v. Tarpilauskas, 266 Mass. 498, 165 N. E. 5r3 (1929) (by implication) (parental rela-
tionship). RESTAT MENT, TORTS (1939) § 769, 772, 773; HARPER, TORTS (1933) § 232;
Notes (935) 33 Micar. L. REv. 943, 945, (932) 17 CORN. L. Q. 509, 518, citing Mc-
Kee v. Hughes, 133 Tenn. 455, 181 S. W. 930 (1916).
i6. HARPER, TORTS (1933) § 6r, n. 98 (trespass); id. § 249 (defamation) ; id. § 275
(disparagement of title).
17. See notes 15 and z6 supra.
18. ". . . his [the agent's] purpose may disclose that he is not genuinely engaged
in asserting the protected interest, in which case no conflict really arises between it and
the interest of the injured party." Learned Hand, J., in Sidney Blumenthal & Co. v.
U. S., 30 F. (2d) 247, 249 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929).
i. New Yorker, Aug. 14, 1937, p. 22.
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minority,2 his subsequent retired life, and his present way of living were
truthfully described. Held, since the plaintiff was former public figure, it
was still matter of public concern whether he had fulfilled his early promise
of genius; since the comments were a truthful and "not unfriendly" descrip-
tion of "ordinary aspects of personality" s his right of privacy was not
invaded.4 Sidis v. F-R Pub. Corporation, 113 F. (2d) 8o6 (C. C. A. 2d,
1940).5
The right of privacy has been recognized as a common law right in a
majority of jurisdictions. 6  While it is everywhere conceded that it must
give precedence to the conflicting principle of freedom of the press, 7 there
have been few attempts to determine where the boundary lies." Under the
first, or "collective" approach, it is said that the press may publish every
(non-libelous) matter which is of legitimate public interest." Thus the
2. His career as a scientifically trained child prodigy culminated when, at the age
of ii as a special student at Harvard, he lectured to a group of mathematicians on
"Four Dimensional Bodies." Later he suffered a nervous breakdown and contracted
a hatred of "crowds" and publicity. But he was still news as a graduate of Harvard
Law School at i9, a Professor of Mathematics at 20, a May Day rioter at 21. Loc.
cit. supra note i.
3. "But when focused upon public characters, truthful comments upon dress,
speech, habits, and the ordinary aspects of personality will usually not transgress the
line." However, it was also said in the opinion that "some of the personal details were
of the sort that Warren and Brandeis believed 'all men alike are entitled to keep from
popular curiosity'," and that the article "may be fairly described as a ruthless exposure
of a once public character, who has since sought and has now been deprived of the
seclusion of private life." Sidis v. F-R Pub. Corporation, 113 F. (2d) 8o6, 8o7, 809
(C. C. A. 2d, x94).
4. Plaintiff claimed there had been a violation of his right of privacy as protected
in California, Georgia, Kansas, Kentucky and Missouri. Defendant's motion to dis-
miss had been granted by the lower court. 34 F. Supp. ig (S. D. N. Y. 1938).
5. The court also affirmed the dismissal of cause of action based on alleged viola-
tion of plaintiff's right of privacy as protected by N. Y. Statute, N. Y. CoNs. LAws
(Cahill, 1930) c. 7, §§ 50, 51, because publication was not "for advertising purposes or
for purposes of trade".
6. In New York, Rhode Island and Washington there is no common law right of
privacy; it does not seem to exist in either Michigan or Wisconsin.
It has been recognized, at least impliedly, in the following jurisdictions: Alaska,
Arkansas, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Missouri, New Jersey,
North Carolina; and also by some federal courts (prior to Erie R. R. v. Tompkins).
In California, however, it does not seem to exist as common law; it is merely an
element of the broader constitutional right to pursue and obtain happiness. For a
criticism of the attitude of the California courts see Note (1939) 13 So. CALn. L.
Rrv. 8r, 88.
The cases are analyzed and discussed in Kacedan, The Right of Privacy (1932)
12 B. U. L. REV. 353, 6oo; see also Dicker, The Right of Privacy, A Proposed Redefi-
nition (1936) 70 U. S. L. REv. 435, and Note (194o) 5 Mo. L. Ray. 343; Note (ig39)
13 So. C.ArF. L. REv. 81; Eldredge, Modern Tort Problems (i94o) Lectures to Cleve-
land Bar Association, 61.
7. Warren and Brandeis, The Right of Privacy (i8go) 4 HARv. L. Rav. 193, 214;
Pasevich v. New England Life Insurance Co., 122 Ga. 190, 202, 50 S. E. 68, 73 (i9o5) ;
Sidis v. F-R Pub. Corporation, 34 F. Supp. i9, 25 (S. D. N. Y. 1938), and also 113
F. (2d) 806, 8o9 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940).
8. Comparatively few "disclosure" cases have been decided, most of which involve
the publication of photographs. As to the distinction between "disclosures", "appropri-
ations" and "intrusions" see Dicker, The Right of Privacy, A Proposed Redefinition
(1936) 70 U. S. L. REV. 435.
9. "The right of privacy does not prohibit any publication of matter which is of
public or general interest", Warren and Brandeis, The Right of Privacy (189o) 4
HARv. L. Rav. 193, 214. See RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1939) § 867, Comment c. Sidis
v. F-R Pub. Corporation, 113 F. (2d) 806, 8og (C. C. A. 2d, ig4o) ; Sweenek v. Pathe
News, 16 F. Supp. 746, 747 (E. D. N. Y. 1936) (decided under the N. Y. Statute);
see Metter v. Los Angeles, 35 Cal. App. (2d) 304, 309, 310, 32, 95 P. (2d) 491, 494,
495, 496 (1939); Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 770, 299 S. W. 967, 970 (1927);
Pasevich v. New England Life Insurance Co., 122 Ga. 190, 2P4, 50 S. E. 68, 73 (1905).
Warren and Brandeis suggested that this exception should be developed by analogy
with the qualified privilege of comment and criticism on matters of public and general
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court in the instant case held that it is of public interest to know what
becomes of a former child prodigy.10 This amounts, in effect, to giving
the press a broad and permanent privilege periodically to inspect the lives
of such persons. However, the court indicated that there would be limits
to the permissible "disclosures". 1" Under the second, or "individual" ap-
proach, it is said that a "public character" has "waived" his right of privacy,'-'
willingly or otherwise,18 but the courts do not make clear whom they will
hold a "public character" in this connection 1 4 Moreover, this implied
waiver Is has a limited effect; the "public character" does not lose his right
to privacy in all respects.'6 Further, a former "public character", who
has chosen to lead an obscure life, could be considered, without unreason-
ably curtailing the privileges of the press, to have regained, after a reason-
able period of time,'7 that right of privacy he had "waived", so far as to be
protected from further public scrutiny of at least his present way of living.'
interest. But here the privilege seems to be absolute as it is generally stated that
"malice" is immaterial. Moreover it exists whether or not the person has submitted
himself or his work for criticism. Therefore even in this respect the analogy with the
law of libel is not a perfect one.
1o. There seems to be a public interest in knowing what has become of a child
prodigy and whether he is now a great scientist or a little clerk. But the article went
much further than that; see note 5 supra.
ii. They should be confined to the "ordinary aspects of personality" and not "out-
rage the community's notions of decency". The news worthiness of the matter would
not always be a defense; at p. 8og.
i2. "There are persons who may reasonably claim as a right, protection from the
notoriety entailed by being made the victims of journaistic enterprise. There are
others who, in varying degrees, have renounced the right to live their lives screened
from public observation." Warren and Brandeis, The Right of Privacy (i89o) 4 HARv.
L. REv. 193, 215. See Corliss v. Walker Co., 64 Fed. 28o, 282 (C. C. D. Mass. i894);
Melvin v. Reid, 1z12 Cal. App. 285, 290, 297 Pac. 91, 93 (1931). "There are times . .
when one, whether willingly or not, becomes an actor in an occurrence of public or
general interest." Jones v. Herald Post Co., 230 Ky. 227, 229, i8 S. W. (2d) 972, 973
(1929). "The right of privacy . . . may be waived. . . ." "Any person who en-
gages in any pursuit . . . which calls for the approval . . . of the public submits
his private life to examination.... Pasevich v. New England Life Ins. Co., i=n
Ga. i9o, i99, 5o S. E. 68, 72 (19o5). As examples this court gave a candidate for pub-
lic office, a holder of public office and those who belong to the learned professions.
For other examples see Metter v. Los Angeles Examiner, 35 Cal. App. (2d) 304, 312,
95 P. (2d) 49, 496 (939) (person who commits suicide by plunging from top of
building thereby waives her right of privacy); Paramount Pictures, Inc. v. Leader
Press, Inc., 24 F. Supp. 1004, 1007 (W. D. Okla. 1938) (right of privacy of stars not
violated by publication of their names and pictures). The court in the principal case
also discussed the problem in terms of this approach when it said at p. 8o9, "we
would permit limited scrutiny of the 'private' life of any person who has achieved, or
has had thrust upon him, the questionable and indefinable status of a 'public figure."'
See RESTATEMExT, TORTS (1939) § 867, comment c.
13. Jones v. Herald Post Co., 23o Ky. 227, 18 S. W. (2d) 972 (1929); RE-STATE-
MNT, TORTS (939) § 867, comment c; both cited note 12 supra.
14. See note 12 supra.
i5. It is to be distinguished from an express waiver where there is consent to the
disclosure. Paramount Pictures, Inc. v. Leader Press, Inc., 24 F. Supp. 1004 (W. D.
Okla. 1938) ; see Melvin v. Reid, 12 Cal. App. 285, 292, 297 Pac. 9, 93 (I93) ; Pase-
vich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. i9o, z99, 5o S. E. 68, 72 (9o5).
i6. "It may be waived for one purpose and still asserted for another; it may be
waived in behalf of one class and retained as against another class; it may be waived
as to one individual and retained as against all other persons." Pasevich v. New Eng-
land Life Ins. Co., i2 Ga. i9o, i99, 50 S. E. 68, 72 (1905).
17. See RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1939) § 867, comment c.
18. As to his past public acts it seems that they too would gain a private character
after a reasonable period of time. But that period would generally be longer, and dif-
ferent for each one of them. Some of these acts may be "historical" and will never
be private. Others are matters of public record; see Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App.
285, 297 Pac. 91 (193). Others are mere news which will grow stale; see Mau v.
Rio Grande Oil, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 845 (N. D. Cal. 1939), (1940) 88 U. OF PA. L. REv.
374, where one year had elapsed since the occurrence of the public event; Eldredge,
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But the instant court refused to narrow the scope of the waiver and further
held, in effect, that after seventeen years of self-imposed obscurity the
plaintiff had not regained the right that he, or others for him, had waived
when he was a child. This result was reached by a strict interpretation of
the state decisions without regard for their dicta and their spirit.19 It testi-
fies to the cold treatment which, after half a century of evolution, the right
of privacy still suffers at the hands of unsympathetic courts, lending an
indirect and untimely sanction to some abuses of the press.
Tirusts--Liability of Depository for Misappropriation of Trust
Funds-Trustee transferred trust funds deposited in a large city bank,
to his personal account with same bank to make up overdrafts and to repay
personal loans from the bank. Held (two justices dissenting),' that the
bank is not liable without actual knowledge that the trust funds were placed
in the personal account and that here the aggregate knowledge of that fact
was not possessed by anyone in authority. Grace v. Corn Exchange Bank
Trust Co., 19 N. Y. S. (2d) 925 (1940).
A depository is liable for participation in a breach of trust if, knowing
of the trustee's misappropriation it permits him to deposit or withdraw
funds. 2 It is generally held that a mere deposit of trust funds in a personal
account is not enough to put a bank on inquiry; 8 but when the trustee later
pays personal debts to the bank from this same personal account, it is the
almost universal rule that such payment is presumptively wrongful, 4 with
Modern Tort Problems (194o), Lectures to Cleveland Bar Association, 6i, 67. The
period will often be so long that the problem will be purely academic unless a "dis-
closure" or "appropriation" of such acts or events could be said to violate the privacy
of the surviving relatives of the person.
ig. It was said in the opinion of the lower court that the law of the various states
under consideration was that a person's name or picture may not be used without his
consent for trade exploitation or advertising purposes; 34 F. Supp. 19, 25 (S. D. N. Y.
1938) ; approved at 8o8. This does not go any further than the New York statute,
under which only "appropriations", and not "disclosures", are actionable.
i. Justice Adel is of the opinion that the mere presentation of the checks drawn
on the trust account by the trustee payable to the trustee's personal account gave the
bank actual knowledge that trust funds were being deposited in the personal account
(dissenting opinion at 932).
2. RESTATEmENT, TRUSTS (1935) § 324: "If the trustee deposits trust funds in a
bank, the bank is liable for participation in a breach of trust in receiving or permitting
the trustee to withdraw trust funds, where the trustee commits a breach of trust in
making the deposit or withdrawal if, but only if, the bank received the deposit or per-
mitted the withdrawal with notice of the breach of trust."
3. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Metropolitan Nat. Bank, i F. Supp.
514 (D. C. Minn. 1932), appeal dismissed, 64 F. (2d) 1022 (933) ; Allen v. Puritan
Trust Co., 211 Mass. 409, 97 N. E. 916 (912) ; 3 ScoTr ON TRuSTS (i939) § 324.2;
BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (1935) § 9O8. In fifteen jurisdictions this situation is
controlled by the UNFORM FIDUCIARES AcT, § 9: "If a fiduciary makes a deposit in
a bank to his personal credit of checks drawn by him upon an account in his own name
as fiduciary . . . the bank receiving such deposit is not bound to inquire whether
the fiduciary is committing thereby a breach of his obligation as fiduciary; and the
bank is authorized to pay the amount of deposit . . . upon the personal check of the
fiduciary without being liable to the principal, unless the bank receives the deposit or
pays the check with actual knowledge that the fiduciary is committing a breach of his
obligation. . . ." The foregoing act has been adopted in the following jurisdictions:
Colorado, District of Columbia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland, Nevada,
New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Utah, Wis-
consin and Wyoming.
4. First Nat. Bank of Overton v. Greene, ii4 S. W. 322 (Ky. x9o8); Allen v.
Puritan Trust Co., 211 Mass. 409, 97 N. E. 916 (I912) ; Bischoff v. Yorkville Bank,
218 N. Y. io6, 112 N. E. 759 (i916) L. R. A. ipi6F, 1059.
RECENT CASES
some courts going so far as to hold the bank liable for all subsequent defal-
cations.5 The instant case is important because it requires as an element
of liability that the bank have actual knowledge that trust funds are going
into the personal account and refuses to charge the bank with constructive
notice just because the transaction is on the bo6ks. Because there is no
liability imposed at this point, many similar decisions place small emphasis
on it, but assuming such knowledge without indicating why they so decided,
place the emphasis upon the bank's receipt of payment for personal debts.'
Thus the whole question of imposing liability on the bank seems to rest on
a weak foundation. If the law does not oblige the bank to inquire when
trust funds are put into a personal account, the management cannot reason-
ably be expected to know there is a defalcation when the trustee pays his
personal debts to the bank, and should, from a practical viewpoint, be
justified in treating the funds as the trustee's own property.7 The New
York court points out 8 that with the complicated accounting methods of
large scale banking houses, the practical possibilities of any one person ever
piecing together the scraps of information that would reveal that trust funds
are passing into the personal account are slight. All the more unlikely is
it that any one individual would ever know first that the trustee had pre-
viously made such a transfer, and secondly that he was presently withdraw-
ing those funds to pay a personal debt. Such is the realistic basis of the
instant decision and the rule of the Uniform Fiduciaries Act which also
requires actual knowledge. 9 By this rule the bank is relieved of a severe
burden, for as the rule formerly stood, the bank was compelled, once it knew
trust funds were in the personal account, to keep informed as to just how
much of that account constituted trust funds and to be on guard against
receiving any portion of the latter,10 thus becoming in effect a virtual
insurer of the trustee's honesty.
5. Bischoff v. Yorkville Bank, cited note 4 supra; Wagner Trading Co. v. Battery
Park Nat. Bank, 228 N. Y. 37, 126 N. E. 347 (1920).
6. Allen v. Puritan Trust Co., 211 Mass. 409, 97 N. E. 916 (1912) ; Wichita Roy-
alty Co. v. City Nat. Bank, 127 Tex. 158, 89 S. W. (2d) 394 (1935).
7. See United States Fidelity & G. Co. v. Bank, 77 W. Va. 665, 670, 88 S. E. 1o9
(1918).
8. Instant case at 927.
9. UrFoRm FmuciAuas Acr, § 6, is to the effect that if a fiduciary draws a check
on himself as fiduciary, payable to himself personally the bank is not bound to inquire
nor it is charged with notice. Colby v. Riggs Nat. Bank (App. D. C. 1937) 92 F. (2d)
183, held that this was not the same as a fiduciary depositing such check in his personal
account that was overdrawn at the time. The distinction seems hard to find.
io. A recent Washington decision, Pitzen v. Doubleday et al., 1O5 Pac. (2d) 726
(Wash. 1940), holds the bank liable only when it shares in the profits of the misap-
propriation, and apparently the court would not hold the bank liable for other misap-
plications even if the bank actually knew they were in progress.
